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Abstract 
After a long debate on wine import tariffs, the Italian Parliament failed to ratify the Spanish-
Italian trade agreement on December 17th, 1905. This decision – an unusual episode for a 
country with relatively low level of protection – left Spain and Italy without a bilateral trade 
treaty for an entire decade. In the literature, broader political issues and local interests are 
alternatively indicated as the main drivers of the rejection. Based on a manually assembled 
database which collects economic and political variables, including MPs personal features, 
and using a probit model, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of the vote. Results 
show that constituency interests had a role in determining the result of the vote on the trade 
treaty. Moreover, constituency interests were also important for the “vote switchers”, i.e. 
those MPs that supported the overall government policy stance in the first round, but 
opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the second. 
Keywords: trade agreement, tariffs, wine, vote. 
JEL classification: D72, F13, N43, N73. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Después de un largo debate sobre los aranceles a la importación de vino, el 17  
de diciembre de 1905 el Parlamento italiano no ratificó el acuerdo comercial entre España  
e Italia. Esta decisión, un episodio inusual para un país con un nivel relativamente bajo de 
protección, dejó a España y a Italia sin un acuerdo comercial bilateral durante toda una 
década. En la literatura, cuestiones políticas más amplias e intereses locales se indican 
alternativamente como los principales impulsores del rechazo. Utilizando una base de 
datos construida manualmente que recopila variables económicas y políticas, incluidas  
las características personales de los parlamentarios, y basándose en un modelo probit, 
este documento proporciona un análisis cuantitativo del voto. Los resultados muestran que 
los intereses locales desempeñaron un papel en la determinación del resultado de la 
votación del tratado comercial. Además, los intereses de la circunscripción también fueron 
importantes para los «cambiadores de voto», es decir, aquellos parlamentarios que 
apoyaron la postura general de la política gubernamental en la primera ronda, pero se 
opusieron al acuerdo comercial español-italiano en la segunda. 
Palabras clave: acuerdo comercial, aranceles, vino, votación. 
Códigos JEL: D72, F13, N43, N73. 
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1 Introduction 
International trade is embedded in a dense network of multilateral and bilateral agreements 
whose aim is to promote economic integration beyond national borders. However, this 
phenomenon is related to a specific historical process and the development of a precise 
institutional context, which repeatedly overcame very diverse resistances, but it is  
not immutable (Newman et al., 2006). For example, during the first globalization – an episode 
of increasing economic integration during the 19th century closely related to an extraordinary 
fall in trade costs, in terms of both trade policy related instruments (i.e. tariffs) and transport 
(Jacks, Meissner and Novy, 2010) – resistances did not take long to emerge. Relevant 
examples are the increases in tariffs for both agricultural and industrial goods in Germany 
(1879, the so-called “iron and rye” tariff) and Sweden (1888) (Simmons, 2006). In the first case, 
floating voters from the agricultural sector changed the balance in favour of protectionism 
(Lehmann, 2010). In the second, the largest farmers – later joined by smallholders and middling 
farmers – were the main supporters of tariff increases (Lehmann and Volckart, 2011). 
In the case of Italy, Federico and Vasta (2015) suggest that trade restrictiveness 
measures overestimated the Italian level of protection: Italy was, generally speaking, quite 
open. However, they also acknowledge the existence of some episodes where Italian policy 
makers were not acting following a “liberal spirit”. The 1905 rejection of the Spanish-Italian 
trade agreement by the Italian Parliament can be one of them. The Italian authorities called for 
amending the 1892 modus vivendi with Spain in a context of a rapidly increasing bilateral trade 
deficit and a parallel wave of trade policy “modernization” (new treaties were signed with 
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Switzerland in 1904). Therefore, following the rules agreed in 
the 1892 treaty, Italy announced its willingness to end the bilateral agreement, opening a six-
month window for negotiations. Discussions between the two delegations were long. The final 
agreement, signed by the Italian government on 8 November 1905, included a drastic cut on 
tariffs for wine imports in Italy. The Italian Parliament had to vote on the agreement in a heated 
political and social climate. A double roll call vote on the general Government performance and 
on the trade treaty was held on 17 December 1905. While the Government won the former, it 
lost the latter. The roll call nature of the votes is reflected in the minutes of the Parliament, 
where every MP’s vote is recorded (differently from the usual sum of “in favour”, “against”, and 
“abstentions”). The double roll call vote allows both to empirically separate government support 
from the trade agreement support and to fully exploit the variation between the two votes.  
The “Italian case” is important for several reason. First, it provides the first quantitative 
analysis ever on a roll-call vote in Italy during the first globalization, where detailed  
qualitative analysis is also limited: only Garcia Sanz (1993) reconstructed the Parliamentary 
debate within the wider perspective of the Spanish-Italian diplomatic relations. Other studies 
touch upon the issue: Lupo (1998) describes the event as the result of successful lobbying of 
constituency interests, namely those stakeholders associated with wine production. Orsina 
(2002) and Tomasoni (2011) highlight the importance of the wider political framework, such as 
the MPs interests in tumbling the Fortis’ government.1 Second, it helps to understand the 
drivers of an important public policy decision, leaving Spain and Italy without a trade agreement 
for almost a decade (until 1914). Third, it does so in a period (the beginning of 20th century) 
where organized interests, such as trade, business and industry associations, started to 
actively participate in the policy-making process. Finally, the “Italian case” has been studied 
from different perspective, therefore this study adds to the vast literature analysing the course 
                                                                          
1  Alessandro Fortis was the Italian “Prime Minister” (the official name is “President of the Council of Ministers”) from 27 
March 1905 to 8 February 1906. 
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of Italian tariffs (e.g. Coppa, 1970; Federico and Vasta, 2015; Tena Junguito, 2010a; Tena 
Junguito, 2010b; James and O’ Rourke, 2011; Federico and Tena, 1998; Federico and  
Tena, 1999) providing an in-depth case study. 
To summarize, in this paper I aim to empirically estimate whether constituency 
interests played a role in determining the result of the vote. If this is not the case, 
constituency interests should be orthogonal to the voting patterns. In doing so, I exploit a 
unique database, manually assembled from a variety of primary and secondary sources, to 
analyse a rare (if not unique) event: a double roll call vote on a failed attempt to ratify an 
international trade treaty lowering tariffs, and in particular tariffs on wine. 
Results show that constituency interests had a role in determining the result of the 
vote on the trade treaty. Moreover, constituency interests were also important for the “vote 
switchers”, i.e. those MPs that supported the overall government policy stance in the first 
round, but opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the second.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follow: Section 2 revises the literature on 
political economy and the determinants of (MPs) voting behaviours, ; Section 3 describes the 
historical context in which the rejection of the treaty matured; Section 4 details the data 
sources and the methodology used; Section 5 illustrates and interprets the results; and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
At least since Hobbes’ most famous book, “Leviathan”, a buoyant part of the literature has 
developed around the study of the nature of public institutions, and their role in shaping and 
connecting the economic and political dimensions. The vision of the government as a 
benevolent maximizer of social welfare has been gradually giving way to alternative 
explanations of government (and other public institutions) actions, where “special interests” – 
related to rent-seeking, interest groups and constituency interest models (Baldwin and Magee, 
2000; Malcolm, 2017) – influence the outcome, and the government (as any form of 
organization) may experience failures, deviating from possible social optima (see i.a. Grossman 
and Helpman, 2001; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Williamson, 1996).  
Within this context, a strand of the political economy literature deals with “pork-
barrell politics” and the allocation of public investment (or social spending). In this theoretical 
framework, political economy incentives distort public investment from its optimal 
distribution, by the mean of targeting special interest groups (and/or constituents more 
broadly). This literature advocates that what matters for the (geographical) distribution of 
public investment are i) the results of previous elections; ii) members of the Parliament’s 
(MPs) experience and other personal features; iii) political parties membership and 
characteristics (see e.g. Golden and Picci, 2008; Maskin and Tirole, 2014; Rodriguez-Pose, 
Psycharis and Tselios, 2016; Limosani and Navarra, 2001; Fiva and Halse, 2016; Curto-
Grau, Herranz-Loncán and Solé-Ollé, 2012; Bugarin and Marciniuk, 2017). Another strand 
focuses on the geographical differences in vote patterns, i.e. how constituencies differ on 
political sensitiveness to certain issues (e.g. Lampe and Sharp, 2014; Gawande and Krishna, 
2003; Fernandez, 2016). Researchers exploited the polarization of the electoral debate on a 
single issue (very often trade, see Irwin, 1994; Mayda and Rodrik; 2005; Yu, 2009; Clarke et 
al., 2017; Lehmann, 2010; Lehmann and Volckart, 2011; Urbatsch, 2013; but occasionally 
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also wider economic and non-economic issues, see Dostie and Dupré, 2012; Gregor, 
2015; Hodgson, 2012) i) to extrapolate the economic, political and social determinants of 
electoral support; ii) to measure the intensity and role of electorate mobilization (new vs. 
floating voters); and iii) to capture the role of special interest groups in influencing election 
results and in shaping the composition of national legislative institutions accordingly. 
Another strand of research combines the two approaches described above and 
concentrates on the MPs’ voting behaviour. This literature argues that the main explanatory 
variables for understanding MPs’ voting patterns are: i) party affiliation; ii) MPs’ ideology; iii) 
MPs’ experience; iv) MPs’ electoral support; v) the political, economic and social 
preferences of MPs’ constituency; and vi) the strength of constituency interests (e.g. Hix 
and Noury, 2016; Russell and Cowley, 2015; Levitt, 1996; Dixit and Londregan, 1996).2 As 
above, a consistent part of this literature relates to trade policy (e.g. Malcolm, 2017; 
Fordham and McKeown, 2003; Weller, 2009; Choi, 2015; Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Tosini 
and Tower; 1987; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Schonhardt-Bailey, 1991; Erlich, 2007; Erlich, 
2009; Xie, 2006; Galantucci, 2013; Willmann, 2003; Conybeare, 1991; Hansen, 1990; 
Marks, 1993; Nollen and Iglars, 1990; Nollen and Quinn, 1994; Kamdar and Gonzalez, 
1998; Conconi, Facchini and Zanardi, 2014; Kalt, 1988; Boadu and Thompson, 1993; Kang 
and Greene, 1997; Rodrik, 2018; Van Dijck and Truyts, 2011) or “single-issue” politics (e.g. 
Poelmans et al.; 2018). 
Contemporary studies are only able to identify rent-seeking actions related to 
special interest group pressures to the extent that direct industry contribution are legal in 
the country of the study and data are available (for example to political campaign of single 
MPs, see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Gilbert and Oladi, 2012). However, historical 
studies usually face important data limitations on this issue, and often refer to 
“constituents’ interests”, “constituency interests”, or “local (economic) interests” instead. 
Four historical studies are very close to this one, however they focus on Great Britain and 
Belgium, and their decisions to repeal the Corn Laws (i.e. to eliminate a series of 
restrictions on food imports), and Germany. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991; 2003) distinguishes 
the major drivers of the Great Britain repeal of the Corn Laws in party, ideology, and 
constituency interests, indicating the latter as the main cause behind MPs switching vote 
in favour of the abolition of the Corn Laws. Additionally, Schonhardt-Bailey (1998) studies 
the role of parties and interests in the convergence of protectionist interests between 
landowners and industrialists in Imperial Germany. Van Dijck and Truyts (2011) analyse the 
case of Belgium. They first use a probit model to test whether party affiliation, personal 
and constituency economic interests had a role in the decision of liberalizing corn tariffs. 
Once these factors do not seem to matter (differently from the Great Britain case), they 
turn to a qualitative analysis and point to political strategies and ideas to be the drivers of 
the liberalization episode.3  
In this line, I disentangle party, ideology, personal and constituency interests for 
the case of the rejection of the 1905 trade treaty between Spain and Italy. 
                                                                          
2  Another related strand of the literature aims to understand the “do ut des” strategies within the corridors of the 
Parliaments: log-rolling (or “vote-trading”) is suggested to be a constraint for politicians’ voting behaviours (Coates and 
Munger, 1995). Nevertheless, the intrinsic difficulties in properly identifying “log-rolling” limited the number of empirical 
studies on this subject (Irwin, 1994; Irwin and Kroszner, 1996; Stratmann, 1992; Stratmann, 1995; Esteves and 
Geisler-Mesevage, 2017). 
3  For those interested in the broader role of tariffs during the 19th century, the intertwinement of trade and fiscal policy in 
the rise of modern state, and the role of sector interests (and particularly alcohol producers) in other countries (mainly 
United Kingdom), I suggest Ashworth (2003), Nye (2007), and Inikori (2002). 
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3 Historical context: Trade with Spain and the Italian wine economy 
At the beginning of 1905, trade relations between Spain and Italy were governed by a 
provisional trade agreement – a modus vivendi – signed and ratified in 1892. In the treaty, 
Italy granted to apply certain tariffs to the products imported from Spain, broadly similar to 
those included in other bilateral treaties (such as those concluded with Austria-Hungary and 
Germany in 1891 and Switzerland in 1892). However, both countries agreed to exclude 
automatic reduction in tariffs derived by other trade agreements signed with third parties, i.e. 
the Most Favoured Nation clause. For example, the reduction in tariffs for wine negotiated in 
a separate clause with Austria-Hungary (slightly below 6 Italian lire per hectolitre, from the 
initial level of 20), or in another trade treaty with Greece (1899, down to 12 Italian lire), had no 
effects for Spanish products. On the other side, Spain agreed to grant to Italy its 
conventional tariff, without any further restriction, and all the benefits deriving from the 
bilateral treaties signed with the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The Italian 
parliamentary debate on the 1892 modus vivendi was concentrated on wine (Chamber of 
Deputies, 1892), exactly as it happened 13 years later, in 1905. Despite recognizing that 
Spanish wines had little chances to compete with Italian wines in Italy, most of the MPs 
interventions in the Parliamentary debate argued in favour of “maintaining prudence”. 
Jannuzzi’s speech (a MP elected in Apulia, where wine producers were especially hostile to 
the treaty) perfectly exemplify the Chamber’s feelings:  
“I also pray the government to pay attention, when he will negotiate the trade treaty 
with Spain, to save us from any far danger related to the competition coming from 
Spanish wines. It is true that, few days ago, we have widely proven that there is no 
serious fear of competition in Italy including [for wines coming] from the Spanish 
side, but government prudence requires that, in renewing the treaty, all diligent 
precautions shall be used” 
(Jannuzzi, Chamber of Deputies, 1892)4 
The government had the primary objective of avoiding “the interruption of trade 
relations” (Chamber of Deputies, 1892)5 with Spain. Therefore, it excluded wine from the final 
version of the 1892 modus vivendi. From 1892, the agreement was extended three times, 
twice in 1893 and once in 1894 (Chamber of Deputies, 1893, 1894).  
At the beginning of the 20th century, Italy updated its trade agreements with a handful 
of countries (e.g. new treaties were signed with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Switzerland  
in 1904). With that objective in mind, Italy called for amending the 1892 modus vivendi with 
Spain. Therefore, following the rules agreed in the 1892 treaty, Italy announced its willingness 
to end the bilateral agreement, opening a six-month window for negotiations. Differently from 
1892, the (political) equilibrium reached between the governments of the two countries did not 
label wine as a “very sensible issue”, and the agreement signed in November 1905 included a 
40% cut in wine tariffs, passing from 20 to 12 liras. Despite the cut, however, the tariff still 
                                                                          
4  Italian in the original: “Rivolgo anch'io la preghiera al Governo, di badare quando negozierà il trattato di commercio con 
la Spagna, di salvarci da qualsiasi lontano pericolo di concorrenza spagnuola pei vini. È vero che abbiamo, pochi giorni 
or sono, largamente dimostrato che pei vini non vi ha serio timore di concorrenza in Italia anche per parte della 
Spagna; ma prudenza di Governo esige che, nel rinnovare il trattato, si usino tutte le diligenti precauzioni.”   
5  The sentence was pronounced by Benedetto Brin, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time (1892), while 
discussing the approval of modus vivendi.   
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constituted the 60% of the average price for an imported wine (20 liras). On the other side, Italy 
obtained reductions on Spanish tariffs on a variety of agricultural and manufacturing goods.6 
By the end of the month (28 November), the agreement was presented at the 
Chamber of Deputies, in a tense political and social climate, by Tommaso Tittoni, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Many MPs raised their doubts and concerns, and request “the greatest 
consideration and expedition” in the analysis of the bill, because: 
“there are both serious compromised interests and considerable upheavals in the 
provinces that are or believe to be most affected by the agreement with Spain.” 
(Salandra, Chamber of Deputies, 1905)7 
Even if wine flows between Spain and Italy were very low, both countries were highly 
competitive in the international wine market, and indeed they were competitors in third markets 
(Anderson and Pinilla, 2018; Pinilla and Ayuda, 2002). The press widely reported on the 
agreement. “La Stampa” – an important Italian newspapers published in Piedmont (Turin), a 
region where wine producers were among the most hostile groups to the agreement – 
dedicated almost an article a day to the issue for more than one month, since few days after 
the Government signature until the Parliamentary discussion. For example, on 26 November, the 
newspaper published at the centre of its cover page the article: “Rising tension against  
the modus vivendi with Spain”.8 If on one side the journalist describes as “sure” the approval  
of the agreement, on the other he provides prima facie evidence of rising social tensions, with 
street protests and organization of meetings, debates, conventions by Chambers of 
commerce, agricultural and other local associations. Indeed, Federico and Martinelli (2018) 
provide a variety of data to prove that the wine industry represented an important part of Italian 
production at the turn of the 19th century, being the source of 22% of the gross value added of 
agricultural output, 8% of total GDP, and 11% of total private consumption. 
The parliamentary debate started on 11 December in a heated political climate, and 
lasted 7 days. Wine was undoubtedly the main subject, with many MPs describing the difficult 
situation of the European wine markets as a result of the discriminatory trade policy 
implemented by France at the end of the phylloxera plague in the 1890s when France favoured 
Algerian wine imports over the others, therefore reducing imports from both Spain and Italy 
(Meloni and Swinnen, 2018). Other MPs highlighted the success of Spanish exporters in third 
                                                                          
6  Tariff reductions were disseminated across a variety of products. This complicates the empirical estimation of the position 
of MPs from constituencies that would have benefitted from the trade agreement. Additionally, there was no major event in 
support of the approval of the trade agreement. The parliamentary debate was entirely focused on wine (see main text).  
Nevertheless, it is still legitimate to suspect that 1) Italian products that in 1905 were exported more to Spain would have 
benefit the most from the agreement; 2) producers of products that would have been harmed by the protectionist 1906 
(Spanish) Salvador tariff reform (that was already under discussion at the end of 1905) are those that would have been 
more favorable to the approval of the trade agreement, to avoid (expected) sharper tariff increases. In 1905, more than 
one-third of Italian exports was constituted by products from the wood industry (mostly wooden staves and firewood). It 
corresponds to the industry that would have seen a major increase in tariffs with the approval of the 1906 tariff reform 
(Sabaté, 1995). Taking the industrial value added of the wood industry at the provincial level from Ciccarelli and Fenoltea 
(2010), I calculate the total, per capita and per square meter value added by province. Even if, as expected, the three 
measures are positively correlated with the vote in favour of the trade agreement, their coefficient and significance vary 
when inserted in a proper regression framework (replicating the approach used in section 4 with wine). 
7  Emphasis added. Italian in the original: “Le ragioni dello affrettarsi sono evidenti: sia perchè si tratta di gravi interessi 
compromessi, sia perchè vi è una notevole agitazione nelle Provincie che sono o si credono più colpite dall'accordo 
conia Spagna.” 
8  In Italian in the original: “La crescente agitazione contro il “modus vivendi” colla Spagna”. In the Spanish newspapers 
the coverage of the issue was similar (see ABC archive, hemeroteca.abc.es, for example the “The Spanish wines” 
article on 24 November 1905). 
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countries, such as Austria-Hungary and Switzerland, and argued that their achievements were 
at stake with the interests of Italian exporters: these dynamics contributed to fuel Italian fears.9 
Six days later, the debate came to an end. The Government was faced to a confidence vote. 
The Italian Parliamentary rules (as it happens in other countries) authorize a confidence vote as 
a mean of requesting the Parliament to “critically examine and vote on Government conduct 
and actions”, de facto binding Government survival to the result of the vote. 
For our purposes, the most important characteristics of the December 1905 confidence 
vote are two: the first (which applies to all confidence votes) consists in the roll call nature of the 
voting procedure, i.e. the vote of each MP is public and recorded by MP name and surname.  
The second (specific to this vote) is its separation in two voting sessions. With the first vote, the 
Chamber was called to express its opinion on the following sentence: “The Chamber, confirming 
its confidence in the Government’s policy”. It was a confidence vote sensu stricto, i.e. a vote 
requesting the approval of the Government action in broad terms. The second vote focused on 
the trade agreement instead (the agenda reports the vote on “[the Parliament] moves on to the 
discussion of the article”). The government gained the confidence vote with 253 votes in favour 
and 190 against, whereas it lost the vote on the trade agreement with only 135 votes in  
favour and a total of 293 votes against (see next section for more details, particularly Table 1).  
As a consequence, the bill that should have validated the Royal Decree n.548 
(enacted on 18 November 1905) on the application of the provisional trade agreement between 
Italy and Spain was rejected on 17 December 1905. On one hand, since the following day, 
Spanish products entering the Italian territory were “subject to the [Italian] general tariff and 
forbidden to use free warehouses”. On the other hand, following the Spanish Royal Order  
(20 December 1905), Italian products imported in Spain were subjected to the Spanish general 
tariff. The same Royal Order urged custom officers to “accurately check” the origin of products 
(examining the corresponding documents), notably mentioning those exempted from the 
“justification of origin” (i.e. those for which the importer/exporter did not have to provide a 
document proving the country of origin of the good). The aim was to avoid Italian products to 
enjoy advantages conceded to other nations “by the means of a trade treaty” (Chamber of 
Commerce in Milan, 1907). This situation lasted for almost ten years, until 1914, when the two 
nations reached a new trade agreement, this time excluding wine.10  
The intrinsic importance of the trade agreement was reinforced by the Italian electoral 
system, which built a direct link between MPs and constituency interests. Since the approval of 
the Law n. 210 (5 May 1891), Italy had a single-member constituency system. An electoral 
system with this structure traditionally promotes the ties between the MP elected in a 
constituency and the constituents’ interests, as the election of the former is very likely to be 
influenced by the electoral choices of the latter (Finelli, 2000; Fruci and Finelli, 2000).11 
                                                                          
9  For more details on the Parliamentary debate see Garcia Sanz (1993). 
10  The 1914 agreement was not an insignificant change in the trade relations for the two countries. As anecdotal evidence, 
the Milan Chamber of Commerce Archive contains various letters from different firms (for example, La “Cooperativa Aste 
Dorate”, part of the firm “P.tro Presbitero & Figli”, producing frames and other wood products) requesting – at some point 
during 1914 – information on whether or not the 1914 trade agreement had already entered into force (Section III, Box N. 
178: “Commercio Estero – A – Trattati e Legislazione – Iº – Trattati di commercio – Spagna”).   
11  In line with most of other countries of the time, the suffrage in Italy was limited to males above 21 years of age, with a 
primary school certificate or a certain level of census instead. This restricted the electorate to approximately 2.5 million 
people, only 7% of total population (ICSMC, 1946), but almost 30% of male population above 21 years of age (Ministry 
of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, 1900). This was five times more the population with the right to vote when the 
Kingdom of Italy was created in 1861. As in early 20th century wine production in Italy was fragmented across a myriad 
of small farms (Federico and Martinelli, 2018), the expansion of political rights may have strengthened the influence of 
constituency interests, as wine producers may have gained the right to vote, initially even more restricted to the 
economic elites. 
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4 Methodology and Data 
4.1 Methodology 
The aim of the study is to capture the influence of constituency interests, alternatively measured 
by total, per capita and per square meter wine production, on the MPs’ voting patterns. 
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, approximately one-third of the MPs voted 
in favour of the trade treaty. However, among those, only four voted “yes” in the treaty vote and 
“no” in the confidence vote. Oppositely, over the two-thirds that voted against the treaty, more 
than one-third voted in favour of the confidence vote (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Combinations of confidence vote and trade vote 
 Trade  
“against” “in favour” Total Confidence 
Confidence 
“against” 183 4 190 (3) 
“in favour” 109 131 253 (13) 
 Total trade 293 (1) 135  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: The difference between the sum of the two values reported in the cells “against” and “in favour” (shown in 
parenthesis in the table), and the main number reported in the cell “total” is given by MPs that abstained in one or 
both votes or participated only in one vote. Even if they represent only a very small share of the MPs’ population, 
this issue is taken into account in the robustness tests (see Section 5 for more details). 
The use of some simple descriptive statistics provides prima facie evidence that MPs 
may well have taken into account the importance of wine production of their respective 
constituency (province) when called to vote on the trade treaty with Spain. Indeed, ordering wine 
production12 from low to high unveil an increasing trend in the share of MPs that voted against the 
trade treaty in each decile of the distribution (see Figure 1). In other words, the higher the wine 
production in a certain area, the higher the share of MPs against the treaty. The difference is 
particularly relevant at the two extremes of the distribution (bottom 30% and top 30%). 
Figure 1: Share of MPs against the treaty, by deciles of the per capita wine 
production distribution. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Distribution ordered from low production to high production. 
                                                                          
12  Figure 1 shows per capita wine production, but results are similar with total and per square meter wine production. 
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Similar results may be drawn by plotting the values of wine production and the votes 
against the treaty. Figure 2 shows the map of Italy at the province level. In the map on the left, 
wine production values with respect to the Italian mean are reported. Therefore, numbers 
above 1 identify provinces where the values of wine production are above the Italian mean. 
These provinces are portrayed in a darker blue. Values below 1 identify provinces where the 
values of wine production are below the Italian mean. These provinces are portrayed in a lighter 
blue. The same applies to the map on the right, reporting the share of MPs voting against the 
treaty (with respect to the Italian mean).  
Figure 2: Wine production and vote against the trade treaty by province 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Numbers above 1 identify provinces where the values of wine production or the share of votes against the 
trade treaty are above the Italian mean. Values below 1 identify provinces where the values of wine production or 
the share of votes against the trade treaty are below the Italian mean.   
Therefore, I test empirically the two following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Those MPs elected in constituencies where constituency interests are 
stronger (i.e. where wine production – total, per capita or per square meter – is higher) are less 
likely to vote “yes” to the trade agreement. 
Hypothesis 2: Among those MPs that voted in favour of the government (i.e. “yes” in 
the confidence vote), those MPs elected in constituencies where constituency interests are 
stronger (i.e. where wine production – total, per capita or per square meter – is higher) are less 
likely to vote “yes” to the trade agreement. 
Thus, I follow and adapt Van Dijck and Truyts (2011), Malcolm (2017), and Poelmans 
et al. (2018), using a probit model to analyse MPs’ voting pattern. Operationally, I estimate the 
Wine production Vote against the trade treaty 
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two equations – corresponding to the hypotheses outlined above – through two probit models 
specified as follow: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒௜ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑒௞ ൅ 𝛾𝑍ᇱ௜௞ ൅ 𝛿௚௘௢ ൅ 𝑢௜௞             ሺ1ሻ 
𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒௜ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑒௞ ൅ 𝛾𝑍′௜௞ ൅ 𝛿௚௘௢ ൅ 𝜀௜௞             ሺ2ሻ 
In the first equation, which corresponds to the first hypothesis, the dependent variable 
(“Trade_vote”) is a dummy variable equal to one when the MP “i” voted “yes” in the trade vote, 
and zero otherwise.13 In the second equation, which corresponds to the second hypothesis, 
the dependent variable “Switch_vote” is equal to one if MP “i” voted “yes” in the confidence 
vote and “no” in the trade vote, and it is equal to zero when MP “i” voted “yes” in both votes. 
Therefore, in this second case the sample is restricted to 240 MPs. The right hand side is the 
same for both equations: “Wine” is the main variable of interest. The aim is to capture  
the constituency interests. In line with the previous literature (e.g. Poelmans et al., 2018), I 
adopt three different measures (to check the robustness of the results): 1) total wine production 
(expressed in millions of hectolitres); 2) per capita wine production (hectolitres per person); 3) 
per square meter wine production (hundreds of hectolitres per square meter). As data for wine 
production, population and area is available at the provincial level only, I follow Golden and 
Picci (2008) in “propagating the values of variables available in larger units across the smaller 
subunits”. In this case, I propagate provincial values to different constituencies. The main 
reason for doing so is to avoid losing variance of the dependent variable (available at a smaller 
geographical level). However, I also perform a set of robustness tests aggregating the 
dependent variable at the provincial level, calculating, in the spirit of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), 
the percentage of MPs that voted in favour within each province. The “wine” variable is 
expected to be negatively associated with the “Trade_vote” variable, and positively associated 
with the “Switch_vote” variable. Indeed, I expect those MPs coming from districts where 
constituency interests (proxied by wine production) were stronger to be less likely to vote in 
favour of the trade agreement. I also expect, among those MPs that supported the government 
policy stance (sensu lato) in the first round, MPs coming from districts where constituency 
interests were stronger to be “vote switchers” with a higher likelihood.  
Z’ is a vector of control variables. It includes MPs personal features such as 1) 
“Agric_Prof” (“Agricultural Profession”), that identifies whether or not the MP’s principal 
occupation outside the Parliament was related to agriculture (=1 in case the MP “i” 
profession was related to agriculture, e.g. landowner), to control for personal economic 
incentives; 2) “Pol_Aff” (“Political Affiliation”), a dummy that reflects whether or not the MP 
belongs to the same party of the President of the Council of Ministers (=1 in case of same 
party). In the affirmative case, it is likely that voting against government willingness implies 
higher political costs (even if, in the Kingdom of Italy before WWI, governments received 
support mostly from across-the-board majorities),14 and 3) his political support within the 
constituency (Part_win). I combine the share of actual voters over the total electorate with 
the share of votes the candidate received, as the phenomenon of abstention was 
widespread (i.e. participation ranged 60%, ICSMC, 1947). The idea is that the lower the 
margins of victory, the more limited the room for an MP to support controverted issues, 
because lower is the number of votes the MP may afford to lose to regain next elections. 
Additionally, I include a proxy for MP ideology, a relevant issue in the literature, and in line 
with Jackson et al. (1992), Levitt (1996), Burden et al. (2000) and Griffin (2008). However, 
“ideology” is not easy to capture. The literature largely relies on an algorithm (“NOMINATE”, 
                                                                          
13  Only two MPs were present in the vote and abstained. 
14  For further details on this issue, see Banti (1989), Banti (1996), Fruci (2000), Fruci (2002), Lupo (1998). 
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Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) that assign a score to each legislator on a liberal-conservative 
scale. This score is determined by the legislator’s past voting pattern (and its similarity to the 
other legislators’ pattern) and by the type of bill proposed. However, there is not sufficient 
information available for constructing a similar index for the Italian Parliament in the liberal 
era. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the great majority of votes were secret (i.e. only a very 
small minority were roll call votes). As an alternative, I use the roll call vote on the 
Parliament’s approval of the inauguration of the Tommaso Tittoni’s government (in 1904). 
Tittoni was preceded by Giovanni Giolitti’s government, who suddenly resigned, adducing 
health problems. The government led by Giolitti was expression of a liberal approach to key 
issues such as social conflict, strike and other workers’ rights, etc.. The vote on the Tittoni’s 
government was divided in two. The first part asked the Parliament whether or not it was 
supporting the government (160 votes “in favour”, 281 “against”). However, the second part 
asked the Parliament whether or not it was supporting the “liberal ideology” promoted in the 
“manifesto” of the last general elections (273 “in favour”, 88 “against”).15 I use therefore the 
result of this second vote to determine the “liberal” ideology of each MPs (dummy equal to 
one if the MP voted “yes” to the second part of the agenda). Far from replicating the Poole 
and Rosenthal’s algorithm, this strategy nevertheless allows to account for ideology taking 
into account the challenges of measuring “ideology” and “ideas” in a context of limited data 
availability (as argued also by Van Dijck and Truyts, 2011). 
Finally, I control for the MPs experience in government, coding the number of times 
MPs have been appointed for any role in the government, and for the change in GDP per 
capita (1881-1901): MPs from regions that grew more during a period of increasing economic 
integration are expected to be more supportive to trade liberalization. 
4.2 Data 
The database has been assembled from a variety of sources. Nominal votes on both the 
confidence vote on the Italian Government and the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement have 
been manually retrieved from the Atti Parlamentari (Camera dei Deputati) – Discussioni, a 
collection of the Italian Parliament’s work including detailed shorthand reports on the 
Parliamentary debates and votes. Thanks to an impressive effort of the Italian institutions, these 
documents have recently been digitalized and are available to be consulted online on the 
historical section of the Italian Parliament official website (storia.camera.it). To be noted that 
MPs were elected in constituencies, i.e. geographical units smaller than provinces and only 
used for electoral purposes. I exploit this variation in my identification strategy and robustness 
tests. Data on wine production at the provincial level have been collected from the Italian 
Statistical Yearbook for the years 1905-1907, edited in 1908 by the Directorate General for 
Statistics at the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade. The Italian Statistical Yearbook 
reports data collected directly by Directorate General of Agriculture, within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry and Trade. Indeed, since the Italian unification, and to compensate for the 
lack of a land registry,16 the Ministry decided to set up a collaborative system for statistical 
collection. In the first years after unification, the Ministry tried to collect data on a variety of 
products. However, it soon realized that the means at its disposal were “too unequal to the 
purpose” and decided to focus on a selected range of important products, among them wine. 
                                                                          
15  n Italian in the original: “La Camera affermando che si deve continuare l’indirizzo di politica liberale che costituì il 
programma delle ultime elezioni generali ed ebbe anche sanzioni dalla maggioranza di questa assemblea passa 
all’ordine del giorno” (Atti Parlamentari, 24 March 1905, p.1674).   
16  The first complete Italian land registry was completed only in 1929, well after the beginning of the spreading phylloxera 
epidemic (that started around the 1910s, for more details see Federico and Martinelli, 2018). The first project 
concerning the creation of a land registry, started in 1910, but was not completed for a variety of reasons, including 
budgetary constraints due to World War I. 
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The Ministry benefited from the extended network of a collaborative system. The system 
involved Prefects, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and the directors of schools of 
agriculture, agricultural chemistry laboratories, and agricultural stations, as well as other minor 
stakeholders. Therefore, these are the best available data on agricultural production. 
Population data, used to calculate per capita wine production, are available at the provincial 
level from the 1901 census. GDP figures (at the regional level) are from Felice (2009). MPs 
political affiliation and electoral support (electoral participation and results) are from Corbetta 
and Piretti (2009). MPs personal features, such as their profession, and the responsibilities in 
the government have been manually collected from the detailed profiles available in the 
historical section of the Italian Parliament official website (storia.camera.it). Data on other 
confidence votes used in the main regression (1905 vote on the “support of a liberal 
government”, as a proxy for “Ideology”) or in the robustness tests (1906 vote on the second 
Fortis government) have also been manually retrieved from the relevant volumes of the Atti 
Parlamentari (Camera dei Deputati) – Discussioni. Table 2 contains the summary statistics. 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
VARIABLES Sources N mean sd min max 
Confidence_vote 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi voted “yes” in the 
confidence vote 
(Atti Parlamentari, 1905) 
427 0.562 0.497 0 1 
Trade_vote 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi voted “yes” in the 
trade vote 
(Atti Parlamentari, 1905) 
427 0.316 0.466 0 1 
Switch_vote 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi voted “yes” in the 
confidence vote and “no” in the trade vote, and 
=0 if MPi   
240 0.454 0.499 0 1 
Wine 
Wine production in province k, millions of hl, 
average 1901-1905 (Istat, 1908) 
427 0.664 0.572 0.026 2.522 
Wine_pc 
Wine production in province k, hl/pc, average 
1901-1905 (Istat, 1908) 
427 1.219 0.942 0.018 3.934 
Wine_psqm 
Wine per square meter production in province 
k, hundreds of hl/psqm, average 1901-1905 
(Istat, 1908) 
427 1.697 1.641 0.081 7.412 
Agric_Prof 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi  “outside-the-
Parliament“ profession was related to 
agriculture (Italian Parliament official website) 
427 0.065 0.248 0 1 
ΔGDPpc Real GDP per capita growth rate (1881-1901) 
(Felice, 2009) 
427 0.121 0.119 -0.257 0.312 
Gov_Exp 
Government experience, number of times MPi 
has been appointed for any role in the 
government (Italian Parliament official website) 
427 0.592 1.575 0 15 
Pol_aff 
Political affiliation, dummy variable =1 if MPi 
was affiliated to the same party of the Prime 
Minister  (Corbetta and Piretti, 2009) 
427 0.700 0.459 0 1 
Lib_vote See text (Atti Parlamentari, 1905) 427 0.541 0.499 0 1 
Part_win 
Political support, participation*vote received by 
the winner (Corbetta and Piretti, 2009) 
427 42.89 9.395 21.10 80.78  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
5 Results 
This section presents the main results of the two probit models. The first model aims to clarify 
whether constituency interests played a role in determining the result of the vote on the trade 
treaty (“Trade_vote”, Table 3), whereas the second is dedicated to explain the role of constituency 
interests in explaining the behaviour of “vote switchers” (“Switch_vote”), i.e. those MPs that 
supported the overall government policy stance in the first round, but opposed the Spanish-Italian 
trade agreement in the second (Table 7). This section presents also a series of robustness tests 
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(respectively Table 4, 5 and 6 for “Trade_vote”; and Table 8, 9, and 10 for “Switch_vote”), 
including a set of placebo tests using data available for other agricultural products. 
Table 3 show the results for the main specifications for the regressions concerning the 
vote on the trade treaty, i.e. testing whether those MPs elected in constituencies where 
constituency interests are stronger (i.e. where wine production – total, per capita or per square 
meter – is higher) are less likely to vote “yes” to the trade agreement (first hypothesis). I  
use three different proxies for identifying constituency interests: total wine production (Column 1 
to 3), per capita wine production (Column 4 to 6), and per square meter wine production 
(Column 7 to 9). For each of these proxies, I first run a parsimonious specification (Column 1, 4,  
and 7 respectively), where I only include the variable of interest, i.e. the proxy capturing 
constituency interests. Secondly, I add macro-region fixed effects (Column 2, 5, and 8 
respectively). Macro-regions correspond to North-West, North-East, Centre and South. Their 
inclusion is motivated by the aim of capturing the effects related to eventual economic, cultural 
and social differences, as well as broad wine quality differences (the literature usually argues 
that wines in the South were of lower quality with respect of those in the North). Finally, I 
implement a full-fledged model with all the variable of interests included in the regression 
(Column 3, 6, and 9 respectively). The average marginal effect (dy/dx) of constituency interests 
on voting in favour of the trade treaty is negative: the higher the wine production (in total, per 
capita or per square meter terms), the lower the probability of supporting the trade treaty. The 
result is consistent (i.e. the sign does not change) and significant across all specifications.17 In 
the main full-fledged regressions, a one standard deviation difference in the proxy identifying 
constituency interests explains from 6 to 12 percent of the likelihood to vote against the trade 
agreement. Additionally, results show that party interests also influenced the MPs vote choice, 
i.e. if an MP belonged to the same party of the President of the Council of Ministers was more 
likely to vote in favour of the agreement. Ideology is also positively correlated to supporting the 
trade agreement. Here, it is important to remember the extreme difficulty faced in measuring 
ideology, not only related to data availability, and therefore treat this latter result with caution. 
The coefficient of personal interests (MP’s principal occupation outside the Parliament related 
to agriculture, including landowners) is negative and significant. However, only a limited number 
of MPs had direct agricultural interests, as the great majority of MPs were lawyers, civil 
servants, and university professors. 
In the first set of robustness test (Table 4), I include the results of the vote on the Fortis 
II government (which took place few months after the trade vote) to control for the political 
drivers beyond the trade vote (Column 1, 2, and 3). As sometimes argued in the qualitative 
literature, some MPs would have act by having as main objective to tumble the Fortis’ 
government. In this way, I can control – using ex-post information – the MPs choice of 
supporting (again) Fortis for the President of the Council of Ministers role. In Column 4 to 6, I 
use data for 1905 wine production only, instead of the 1901-1905 average. In Column 7 to 9,  
I alleviate the hypothesis that absences among MPs during the vote followed a random 
distribution (i.e. in the main regressions I codify absent MPs as “missing”), and I assume that 
MPs that did not show up for the vote were against the trade treaty (i.e. I codify absent MPs 
with a “0”). In Table 5, following the spirit of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), I run a set of regressions 
aggregating the dependent variable at the provincial level, calculating the percentage of MPs 
that voted in favour of the trade treaty within each province. Respectively, I estimate the 
regression using OLS (Column 1 to 3), fractional probit (Column 4 to 6), and tobit (Column 7 to 9), 
                                                                          
17  In the case of using wine produced per square meter and adding the rest of control variables, the “wine” coefficient 
turns not significant in the main regression. However, the p-value remains close to the 0.1 threshold (0.13). In 
practically the entire set of robustness tests (both at the constituency and at the province level) the coefficient is 
negative and significant even in the regressions with control variables. 
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as the range of possible values for the dependent variable is limited between 0 and 1. Results 
are in line with the main specifications. Finally, in Table 6 I run four placebo tests, using data 
available at the provincial level for other four agricultural products: wheat, rice, corn and oil 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1908). Results show that the production of wheat, rice, corn, and  
oil does not explain the MPs vote, no matter what proxy is chosen (total, per capita or per 
square meter production). 
Table 7 includes the main results of the regressions including “Switch_vote” as 
dependent variable, i.e. testing whether among those MPs that voted in favour of the 
government (i.e. “yes” in the confidence vote), those MPs elected in constituencies where 
constituency interests are stronger (i.e. where wine production – total, per capita or per square 
meter – is higher) are more likely to be “vote switchers”, i.e. to vote “no” to the trade agreement 
(second hypothesis). The average marginal effect (dy/dx) of constituency interests on “vote 
switchers” is positive: the higher the wine production (in total, per capita or per square meter 
terms), the higher the probability that an MP that supported the government policy stance 
(sensu lato) in the first round, opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the second. In 
the main full-fledged regressions, a one standard deviation difference in the proxy identifying 
constituency interests explains from 6 to 13 percent of the likelihood of being a “vote switcher”. 
Differently from when I consider the trade vote only, party interests and ideology do not explain 
“vote switchers”. Finally, the change in GDP per capita (1881-1901) matters: MPs from regions 
that grew more during a period of increasing economic integration were less likely to become 
“vote switchers”. The robustness tests replicate the structure of those performed for the 
previous hypothesis.18 Results are robust to all the alternative specifications, the aggregation of 
data at the provincial level and the placebo tests. 
  
                                                                          
18  Additionally, I also run a bivariate probit model to include the choice of voting in the confidence vote and in the trade 
vote within the same system of equations. Results are in line with those reported in the text and are available  
upon request. 
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Table 3: Main results (Trade_vote) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WINE 
-0.162* 
(0.083) 
-0.151*** 
(0.052) 
-0.168*** 
(0.054) 
      
WINE_PC    
-0.114*** 
(0.038) 
-0.119*** 
(0.029) 
-0.130*** 
(0.029) 
   
WINE_PSQM       
-0.047*** 
(0.025) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.039 
(0.026) 
          
AGRIC_PROF   
-0.145** 
(0.063) 
  
-0.119* 
(0.063) 
  
-0.140** 
(0.065) 
          
ΔGDPPC   0.471 
(0.316) 
  
0.757** 
(0.298) 
  
0.839*** 
(0.306) 
          
GOV_EXP   
0.0193 
(0.014) 
  
0.0155 
(0.014) 
  
0.020 
(0.015) 
          
POL_AFF   
0.256*** 
(0.065) 
  
0.256*** 
(0.067) 
  
0.237*** 
(0.063) 
          
LIB_VOTE   
0.229*** 
(0.069) 
  
0.239*** 
(0.073) 
  
0.250*** 
(0.073) 
          
PART_WIN   
0.002 
(0.003) 
  
0.002 
(0.003) 
  
0.001 
(0.003) 
          
MACRO-
REGION FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on voting “yes” to the trade 
agreement. Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4: Robustness tests (Trade_vote) 
 (1) 
FORTIS  
EX-POST 
(2)  
FORTIS  
EX-POST 
(3) 
FORTIS  
EX-POST 
(4) 
1905 
(ONLY) 
DATA 
(5) 
1905(ONLY) 
DATA 
(6) 
1905(ONLY) 
DATA 
(7) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
(8) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
(9) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
WINE 
-0.167*** 
(0.051) 
  
-0.184*** 
(0.062) 
  
-0.117*** 
(0.042) 
  
WINE_PC  
-0.126*** 
(0.027) 
  
-0.130*** 
(0.028) 
  
-0.094*** 
(0.019) 
 
WINE_PSQM   
-0.044** 
(0.024) 
  
-0.051* 
(0.031) 
  
-0.027 
(0.021) 
          
          
MACRO-REGION 
FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 427 427 427 427 427 427 508 508 508 
  
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on voting “yes” to the trade 
agreement. Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Robustness tests, province level (Trade_vote) 
 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Fractional 
Probit 
(5) 
Fractional 
Probit 
(6) 
Fractional 
Probit 
(7) 
Tobit 
(8) 
Tobit 
(9) 
Tobit 
Wine 
-0.140** 
(0.067) 
  
-0.194** 
(0.097) 
  
-0.140** 
(0.069) 
  
Wine_pc  
-0.104*** 
(0.038) 
  
-0.130*** 
(0.047) 
  
-0.104*** 
(0.036) 
 
Wine_psqm   
-0.078*** 
(0.021) 
  
-0.089*** 
(0.027) 
  
-0.078* 
(0.026) 
          
          
Macro-region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on voting “yes” to the trade 
agreement. Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 6: Placebo (robusteness) tests (Trade_vote) 
 (1) 
RICE 
(2)  
RICE 
(3) 
RICE 
(4) 
CORN 
(5) 
CORN 
(6) 
CORN 
(7) 
WHEAT 
(8) 
WHEAT 
(9) 
WHEAT 
(10) 
OIL 
(11) 
OIL 
(12) 
OIL 
TOTAL 
-0.036 
(0.029) 
  
0.060 
(0.071) 
  
-0.016 
(0.051) 
  
-0.159 
(0.488) 
  
PER CAPITA  
-0.034 
(0.022) 
  
0.018 
(0.039) 
  
-0.031 
(0.021) 
 
 -0.235 
(0.247) 
 
PSQM   
-0.019 
(0.013) 
  
0.008 
(0.020) 
  
-0.016 
(0.019) 
  -0.194 
(0.206) 
             
             
MACRO-
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 427 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on voting “yes” to the trade 
agreement. Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Main results (Switch_vote) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WINE 
0.199** 
(0.100) 
0.214*** 
(0.061) 
0.180*** 
(0.061) 
      
WINE_PC    
0.134*** 
(0.046) 
0.150*** 
(0.036) 
0.140*** 
(0.026) 
   
WINE_PSQM       
0.0536** 
(0.026) 
0.0328 
(0.035) 
0.0391 
(0.026) 
          
AGRIC_PROF   
0.161 
(0.114) 
  
0.118 
(0.111) 
  
0.159 
(0.112) 
          
ΔGDPPC   -2.091*** 
(0.429) 
  
-2.372*** 
(0.451) 
  
-2.418*** 
(0.499) 
          
GOV_EXP   
-0.0731** 
(0.034) 
  
-0.0691* 
(0.036) 
  
-0.0772** 
(0.034) 
          
POL_AFF   
-0.171 
(0.126) 
  
-0.169 
(0.137) 
  
-0.149 
(0.117) 
          
LIB_VOTE   
-0.0359 
(0.091) 
  
-0.0542 
(0.098) 
  
-0.0736 
(0.096) 
          
PART_WIN   
-0.0015 
(0.004) 
  
-0.0014 
(0.004) 
  
0.0003 
(0.004) 
          
MACRO-REGION 
FE NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on switching vote (defined as 
in the text). Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 8: Robustness tests (Switch_vote) 
 (1) 
FORTIS  
EX-
POST 
(2)  
FORTIS  
EX-
POST 
(3) 
FORTIS 
EX-
POST 
(4) 
1905(ONLY) 
DATA 
(5) 
1905(ONLY) 
DATA 
(6) 
1905(ONLY) 
DATA 
(7) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
(8) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
(9) 
ABSENT 
MPS=0 
WINE 
0.168*** 
(0.061) 
  
0.174** 
(0.076) 
  
0.180*** 
(0.061) 
  
WINE_PC  
0.133*** 
(0.026) 
  
0.131*** 
(0.036) 
  
0.140*** 
(0.026) 
 
WINE_PSQM   
0.041 
(0.025) 
  
0.048 
(0.033) 
  
0.039 
(0.026) 
          
          
MACRO-
REGION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on switching vote 
(defined as in the text). Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9: Robustness tests, province level (Switch_vote) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2)  
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FRACTIONAL 
PROBIT 
(5) 
FRACTIONAL 
PROBIT 
(6) 
FRACTIONAL 
PROBIT 
(7) 
TOBIT 
(8) 
TOBIT 
(9) 
TOBIT 
WINE 
0.186** 
(0.073) 
  
0.245*** 
(0.0937) 
  
0.186** 
(0.075) 
  
WINE_PC  
0.142*** 
(0.047) 
  
0.199*** 
(0.059) 
  
0.142*** 
(0.038) 
 
WINE_PSQM   
0.0715** 
(0.034) 
  
0.119*** 
(0.043) 
  
0.0715** 
(0.028) 
          
          
MACRO-
REGION FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on switching vote 
(defined as in the text). Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Placebo (robusteness) tests (Switch_vote) 
 (1) 
RICE 
(2)  
RICE 
(3) 
RICE 
(4) 
CORN 
(5) 
CORN 
(6) 
CORN 
(7) 
WHEAT 
(8) 
WHEAT 
(9) 
WHEAT 
(10) 
OIL 
(11) 
OIL 
(12) 
OIL 
TOTAL 
0.030 
(0.026) 
  
0.030 
(0.111) 
  
-0.004 
(0.070) 
  
-0.337 
(0.548) 
  
PER CAPITA  
0.017 
(0.014) 
  
-0.008 
(0.071) 
  
-0.010 
(0.038) 
 
 0.059 
(0.233) 
 
PSQM   
0.014 
(0.014) 
  
0.016 
(0.034) 
  
-0.023 
(0.025) 
  0.071 
(0.204) 
             
             
MACRO-
REGION FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, and show average marginal effects (dy/dx) on switching vote (defined as 
in the text). Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to clarify the debate on the drivers of the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-
Italian trade agreement perpetrated by the Italian Parliament, an important public policy decision 
that left Spain and Italy without a trade agreement for almost a decade. Particular attention is 
devoted to understand whether constituency interests played a role in determining the outcome 
of the vote, as the literature has been divided in describing the event either as the result of 
successful lobbying of constituency interests, namely those stakeholders associated with wine 
production or as the by-product of a wider political context (i.e. the MPs willingness to tumble the 
Fortis’ government). The paper provides the first quantitative analysis ever on a roll-call vote in 
Italy during the first globalization, a period where organized interests, such as trade, business and 
industry associations, started to actively participate in the policy-making process.  
Based on a new database, manually assembled from a variety of primary and 
secondary sources, results show, on one side, that those MPs elected in constituencies where 
constituency interests are stronger are less likely to vote “yes” to the trade agreement. 
Additionally, party interests and ideology show positive association with the support to the 
trade agreement. On the other side, results illustrate that among those MPs that voted in favour 
of the government (i.e. “yes” in the confidence vote), those MPs elected in constituencies 
where constituency interests are stronger are more likely to be “vote switchers”, i.e. to vote 
“no” to the trade agreement. In other words, the higher the wine production (in total, per capita 
or per square meter terms), the higher the probability that an MP that supported the overall 
government policy stance in the first round, opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the 
second. Differently from when I consider the trade vote only, party interests and ideology do 
not explain “vote switchers”. Finally, the change in GDP per capita (1881-1901) matters: MPs 
from regions that grew more during a period of increasing economic integration were less likely 
to become “vote switchers”.  
Further research is needed (including the collection of product-level tariff data from 
primary sources) to fully understand the dynamics of lobbying activities and lobbyists, and the 
“sensitivity of Italian decision makers to their efforts” (Federico and Tena, 1999). 
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